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Abstract 
 
This article views section 4 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978 against 
section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 and Article 31 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 (hereafter TRIPS). The 
purpose is to find a suitable framework for the state/government 
use/utilisation of patented products or processes for public 
purposes. A comparison is done with the Crown use provisions 
in United Kingdom, Australian and Canadian law to find a 
suitable approach to questions relating to remuneration for state 
use, the prior negotiations requirement set by Article 31 of 
TRIPS, and the public purposes and exclusive patent rights that 
would be included under state use. The COVID-19 international 
pandemic has caused a state of national disaster in South Africa, 
which is exactly the kind of situation of extreme urgency 
envisioned by the exception in Article 31 of TRIPS, which permits 
the state use of patents without requiring prior negotiations with 
the patent owner. In the battle against COVID-19 and its 
concomitant fallout, the South African government (and 
authorised private parties) would be permitted to utilise patent 
rights without explicit authorisation from the patent owner and 
without prior negotiations, but subject to the payment of 
reasonable remuneration by the government and other terms 
and conditions as agreed upon or as determined by a court. This 
may include making (manufacturing), using, exercising, and 
importing patented products (for example, personal protective 
equipment, pharmaceuticals, ventilators and diagnostic tests) 
deemed necessary in the fight against COVID-19. Foreign 
jurisdictions considered in this article indicate that section 4 of 
the Patents Act 57 of 1978 may certainly benefit from an update 
to provide detailed guidance on the state use of patented 
products or processes for public purposes. In the interest of a 
timeous offensive against the COVID-19 virus, the patent 
provisions need a speedy update to allow state use compliant 
with TRIPS and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. 
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1 Introduction 
Statutory monopoly rights granted as patents protect qualifying inventions. 
The essence of these rights is that patentees may prevent others from 
exploiting their inventions for a fixed term from the date of the application 
for a patent, 20 years1 in South African law. In return for this monopoly right, 
the patentee must fully disclose the invention so that others may freely use 
it after the expiry of the term, once it falls in the public domain.2 In order to 
be patentable, an invention must be novel,3 inventive,4 and capable of 
application in trade, industry or agriculture.5 Once the registrar grants a 
patent, the patentee has the right to exclude other persons from making, 
using, exercising, disposing of, offering to dispose of, or importing the 
invention into South Africa, for the patentee to "have and enjoy the whole 
profit and advantage accruing by reason of the invention."6 Doing any of 
these acts reserved exclusively for the patentee without authorisation 
amounts to infringement.7 
A patent is valuable to society only when effectively utilised, and utilisation 
may occur through assignment and licensing. This links to the human 
flourishing theory of property, which postulates that property is not only 
about rights, but also about obligations, including social obligations.8 This is 
                                            
* Mikhalien du Bois. LLB LLD (US). Associate Professor: Department of Mercantile 
Law, Unisa, South Africa. E-mail: dboism@unisa.ac.za, ORCiD: 0000-0001-9171-
8760. This article was first presented as a paper at the Association for Law, Property, 
and Society's 10th Annual Meeting in May 2019 at Syracuse University, Syracuse, 
New York. The Unisa School of Law Research and Innovation Fund made this visit 
to Syracuse University possible financially. Thank you to the participants for their 
comments. I had an additional opportunity to elicit comments when the article was 
presented at the South African Association of Intellectual Property Law and 
Information Technology Law Teachers and Researchers Conference in July 2019 at 
the University of Cape Town. Thank you especially to Richard M. Shay, who read 
numerous drafts and discussed ideas on the topic. 
1  Section 46 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
2  Grant "Patents" 239; Van der Merwe "Law of Patents" 359; Burrell Burrells South 
African Patent and Design Law paras [1.3], [3.2]. 
3  Sections 25(5)-(9) and 26 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
4  Section 25(10) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978; Roman Roller CC v Speedmark 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1996 1 SA 405 (SCA); Ensign-Bickford (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v 
AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd 1999 1 SA 70 (SCA); Schlumberger-Logelco 
Inc v Coflexip SA 2000 3 SA 861 (SCA); Ausplow (Pty) Ltd v Northpark Trading 3 
(Pty) Ltd 2011 4 All SA 221 (SCA). 
5  Section 25(1) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
6  Section 45(1) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
7  Section 45(1) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978; Grant "Patents" 273; Van der Merwe 
"Law of Patents" 420. 
8  Alexander 2013 https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/653/ 10: "Ownership is 
not about rights only; it is equally about obligations [and] the soundest normative 
foundation of those obligations is human flourishing." 
M DU BOIS  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  3 
particularly applicable to patents, since the entire reason for the protection 
of patent rights lies in the quid pro quo theory.9 A patent owner receives 
monopoly rights for a limited time under the understanding that the public 
must benefit both during the term of the patent (via utilisation or licensing to 
facilitate access to patented products) and once the term has expired (via 
information falling into the public domain). 
The operation of law and assignment may transfer the ownership of patents. 
Some or all rights may transfer on assignment, and a patent may be 
attached or subject to hypothecation.10 Voluntary licences facilitate patent 
owners to permit third parties to exercise all or some exclusive patent rights. 
For example, a patentee may license a pharmaceutical company to 
exclusively manufacture and sell its patented medicine in South Africa for 
five years, subject to the payment of a yearly licence fee, with or without 
royalties.11 
The Patents Act 57 of 1978 (hereafter the Patents Act or South African 
Patents Act, when contrasting it with the Acts of other jurisdictions) also 
provides for compulsory licences for dependent patents,12 and the abuse of 
patent rights.13 The first applies where a patentee cannot utilise a patent 
without infringing a prior patent, a situation which could stifle innovation. The 
latter generally applies where an invention is inadequately utilised in South 
Africa, which is detrimental to the public. For example, where a patent 
holder fails to meet the demand for a patented article or its price is too high 
relative to that in other countries. Both forms of compulsory licences make 
technological innovations available in the public interest, and the 
commissioner of patents may determine the licence conditions, including 
the remuneration due by the licensee. While compulsory licensing 
provisions also constitute a TRIPS flexibility that is available to the 
government to facilitate access to patented products and processes, the 
focus of this article falls on the state or government use provisions contained 
in the Patents Act.14 
                                            
9  See Letraset Ltd v Helios Ltd 1972 3 SA 245 (A) 249; Premier Hangers CC v Polyoak 
(Pty) Ltd 1997 1 SA 416 (A) 424I; Merck Sharp Dohme Group v Cipla Agrimed (Pty) 
Ltd 2015 BIP 101 (SCA) para [2]; Alberts 2007 De Rebus 45; Grant "Patents" 239; 
Van der Merwe "Law of Patents" 359; Burrell Burrells South African Patent and 
Design Law para [1.1]; Du Bois 2018 PELJ 1-38. 
10  Section 59 and 60 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
11  Biagio "Commercial Considerations" 361-362, 366-372. 
12  Section 55 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
13  Section 56 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
14  This article does not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of all patent law 
mechanisms that are available to facilitate access to essential pharmaceuticals, or 
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Somewhat peculiar to the patent regime - as opposed to other categories of 
property,15 but not peculiar to South African law in particular – is the fact 
that provisions for the utilisation, acquisition and assignment of inventions 
or patents by the state are made in the governing legislation, the Patents 
Act. These encapsulate three distinct categories of use for state purposes 
or "government use".16 
In the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, comparable provisions are 
termed Crown use provisions. Broadly, the state may utilise or acquire any 
invention or patent. This may entail either a negotiated acquisition or a 
unilateral divestment, depending on the circumstances. The provisions 
provide guidance where a negotiated acquisition fails and an expropriation 
(a taking or acquisition) of property or property rights happens. In the case 
of acquisition, ownership and all beneficial uses are taken over. With state 
utilisation, not all patent rights are necessarily implicated, and it may be only 
temporary. Patent rights granted to qualifying inventions in terms of the 
South African Patents Act are included under the constitutional property 
concept17 and as such are protected against arbitrary deprivations and 
                                            
an analysis of all available Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (1994) (TRIPS) flexibilities. Its focus falls exclusively on the state (or 
government) use and acquisition provisions that allow only the Government to utilise 
or acquire patents for public purposes, especially where these need to be accessed 
quickly in order for the Government to provide services to the public. This article also 
does not focus on compulsory licensing, which is another TRIPS flexibility that may 
also be utilised by the Government. See Du Bois 2018 SAIPLJ 80-90, for an analysis 
of South African compulsory licensing provisions, the doctrine of the exhaustion of 
rights in patent law, Articles 30bis and 31 of TRIPS, and other methods to facilitate 
access to essential pharmaceuticals. For further reading on the application of TRIPS 
flexibilities, see Park, Prabhala and Berger Using Law to Accelerate Treatment 
Access, particularly at 55-72 (paras 2.5-2.6); Vawda and Shozi Eighteen Years after 
Doha, particularly 27-31. On compulsory licensing, see Vawda 2019 SAIPLJ, 
particularly at 197-198 on the strengthened role that compulsory licensing should 
play in access to pharmaceuticals; Vawda Compulsory Licensing Jurisprudence 19. 
15  Excepting s 46 of the Designs Act 195 of 1993, permitting secrecy of designs in the 
national interest, subject to reasonable compensation by the Minister to the design 
proprietor, as may be agreed upon, determined by arbitration, or by a court. 
16  The Patents Act 57 of 1978, under s 4 and Chapter XIV (Acquisition of rights to 
inventions and patents by the State) encompassing state acquisitions (s 78) and 
assignments (s 79) of patents. In general, in South African, United Kingdom, 
Australian and Canadian law, the term "remuneration" is used to refer to that which 
would be due to the patent holder for state/government/Crown utilisation of patents, 
while "compensation" is used to refer to the payment received by a patent holder for 
state/government/Crown acquisitions of patents or assignments of patents to the 
State. "Compensation" generally caters for a broader range of affected interests than 
"remuneration", which is often defined as simply what a willing licensee would pay 
for the utilisation of a patent. 
17  Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution). A patent is vested and hence protectable in terms of the constitutional 
property clause once it complies with the requirements and is registered, but since 
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uncompensated expropriations.18 Hence, the state use provisions in the 
Patents Act may be tested against section 25(1), (2) and (3) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the 
Constitution). 
No South African court cases provide clarity on the precise meaning and 
intended purpose of the state use provisions, therefore this article 
undertakes a comparative and constitutional study, with a focus on United 
Kingdom, Australian, and Canadian law, to provide interpretational clarity. 
The article outlines the South African state use (utilisation, acquisition and 
assignment) provisions and puts them into perspective as far as 
constitutional property law is concerned. It also illuminates some select 
issues from comparative jurisdictions, in order to provide some clarity and 
guidance for South African law, especially in the light of the intentions of the 
Intellectual Property Policy Phase 1 2018, to update the state (government) 
use provisions.19 
Likewise, the other jurisdictions dealt with in more detail below have a 
paucity of case law. It is likely that these states employ Crown use 
provisions as a bargaining chip. Once the state threatens to invoke state 
use provisions, patent owners are more likely to agree to voluntary licensing 
or assignment. Hence the lack of a body of case law. 
                                            
the priority date of a patent is the date of application and there are already property 
interests at that stage, it is viewed as conditionally protected in the period between 
application and registration. If the registrar grants a patent, the interests become 
vested rights and if not, the interests lapse and are no longer protectable as property 
interests. See Du Bois 2018 SAIPLJ 67-91; Du Bois and Shay "Regulation at the 
Edge of the Property Concept" 419-446 on intangible property interests that South 
African courts have accepted as constitutional property. For arguments pro the 
inclusion of intellectual property rights under the constitutional property clause (s 25 
of the Constitution) see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 143-150; Du Bois 
2012 SA Merc LJ 177-193; Van der Walt and Shay 2014 PELJ 52; Burrell Burrells 
South African Patent and Design Law para [1.15]. 
18  Section 12(3) of the Draft Expropriation Bill, 2019 (GN 1409 in GG 42127 of 21 
December 2018) proposes reforms to s 25 of the Constitution to introduce nil 
compensation for expropriation. In its current form, these changes are aimed only at 
immovable property in the context of land reform and are hence unlikely to affect 
intellectual property such as patents, although the final amendment may change this 
position. See Viljoen 2020 TSAR 37-40; Hoops 2019 SALJ 261 on the implications 
of this proposed amendment. 
19  Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of South Africa Phase 1 2018 (Gen N 518 
in GG 41870 of 31 August 2018) 28-29 (para 7.1.9.1 Government use). 
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2 A constitutional approach to state use provisions in the South 
African Patents Act 
2.1  State utilisation of patents via section 4 of the Patents Act 
The state use provisions in the Patents Act have not received much 
attention in academic scholarship.20 Section 4 of the Patents Act 
determines: 
A patent shall in all respects have the like effect against the State as it has 
against a person: Provided that a Minister of State may use an invention for 
public purposes on such conditions as may be agreed upon with the patentee, 
or in default of agreement on such conditions as are determined by the 
commissioner on application by or on behalf of such Minister and after hearing 
the patentee.21 
In this case, the state may utilise a patent for public purposes by making, 
using, exercising, or importing the invention, for example. Whether state use 
should also include disposing of or offering to dispose of the invention is 
more contentious. Broadly speaking, state use provides a defence against 
patent infringement that the state or an authorised person may use, subject 
to remuneration. A succinct description highlights the differences between 
compulsory licences and state use (or government use): They are "two 
distinct policy tools: 'compulsory licences', as issued by courts, and 
'government use' as issued by the state."22 The vague wording of section 4 
raises many questions: Is it an acquisition that might be an expropriation, or 
does it entail only temporary use without taking over all beneficial uses? The 
rights in the bundle of exclusive rights connected to a patent entail the 
prevention of unauthorised use, and if the state exercises all the rights, what 
is left? How long the state uses the patent for is crucial, since a patent term 
is only twenty years, and for pharmaceuticals the term is even shorter once 
all regulatory approvals are complete. Which kind of conditions of 
exploitation might be appropriate for the commissioner of patents to 
determine? They have to include some form of remuneration, but how 
                                            
20  Ramsden Guide to Intellectual Property Law provides little elucidation on state use 
provisions: 239 on s 4, 342 on ss 78 and 79, 343-344 on s 80. Park, Prabhala and 
Berger Using Law to Accelerate Treatment Access 57-61 (para 2.6) considers the 
provisions in greater detail. 
21  Section 4 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. The list of definitions in s 2 of the Patents 
Act 57 of 1978 defines "Minister" as the Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology 
(in 2009 this portfolio was split into Economic Development and Trade and Industry, 
and since 2019 it is once again combined under the portfolio of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry). 
22  Park, Prabhala and Berger Using Law to Accelerate Treatment Access 57 (para 2.6). 
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should that be determined?23 Must the Minister approve use before or after 
use commences? When/are prior negotiations with the patent holder 
mandatory?24 When and for which purposes would the state be justified in 
invoking state use provisions under section 4? 
Although section 4 of the Patents Act provides for a negotiated acquisition 
of patent use where possible,25 the wording of the article also provides 
guidance where such a negotiated acquisition fails and a unilateral 
divestment and as such a possible expropriation takes place.26 The section 
requires that the Minister should have attempted to negotiate with the 
patentee, but failing that, the commissioner would determine the conditions 
for use. However, the section does not explicitly state whether conditions 
must be determined before the exploitation commences. The state use 
provisions in section 4 of the Patents Act constitute the authorising 
legislation for a legitimate expropriation as required by section 25(2), and 
the state can therefore expropriate a patent for a public purpose or in the 
public interest. State actions taken in terms of these provisions may be 
tested against section 25(1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution. 
In the light of section 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution, the conditions so 
determined by the commissioner of patents would have to include payment 
of just and equitable compensation in line with the factors provided in 
subsection (3). These are (a) the current use of the property, (b) the history 
of the acquisition and use of the property, (c) the market value of the 
property, (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficial capital investment of the property, and (e) the 
purpose of the expropriation. Subsection 4(b) states explicitly that property 
is not limited to land, so the expropriation provisions in section 25 are 
applicable to intellectual property as well as tangible property. 
                                            
23  Park, Prabhala and Berger Using Law to Accelerate Treatment Access 57 (para 2.6): 
"[T]he provisions for government use are inadequate; and the guidelines for 
determining adequate remuneration with respect to both compulsory licenses and 
government use are vague." 
24  In the US a patentee does not even have to be informed of government use, and 
would merely be entitled to compensation based on eminent domain after the fact, 
as provided by the Tucker Act 28 USC §1498(a). 
25  Burrell Burrells South African Patent and Design Law paras [3.19]-[3.22] defines 
public use in s 4 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978 as "putting the invention into practice 
for public purposes." This would include disposing of or offering to dispose of the 
invention under the acts that the state would be permitted to do in terms of this 
section [para 3.20]. 
26  Du Bois 2018 SAIPLJ 76-77. 
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2.2  Other provisions in the Patents Act providing State powers 
relating to patents 
Chapter 14 of the Patents Act, "Acquisition of rights to patents and 
inventions by the State", includes provisions on acquisition,27 the 
assignment of patents relating to armaments,28 and the secrecy of patents 
in the national interest.29 Section 78 of the Patents Act on acquisition 
provides that "the Minister may, on behalf of the State, acquire, on such 
terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, any invention or patent." It 
stipulates who may acquire patents and inventions on behalf of the state, 
namely the Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology,30 as outlined in 
the definitions of the Patents Act. If the parties do not agree on the 
conditions,31 the provisions further provide for arbitration or for the 
commissioner of patents to determine the relevant conditions. The state or 
Minister cannot simply impose conditions; these need to be determined with 
reference to constitutional principles. Where the compensation is 
inadequate or the terms and conditions unfair, that could amount to arbitrary 
deprivation or an unconstitutional expropriation, depending on the particular 
facts. Where the parties reach no agreement it is likely that a High Court 
judge sitting as the commissioner of patents would have to ensure that the 
terms, including the remuneration, were fair and in line with constitutional 
principles. The Patents Act (or regulations) could incorporate clearer 
guidelines and more precisely defined terms for state or government use in 
terms of section 4, as is the case with acquisitions. No South African court 
cases elucidate the processes facilitating either state use or state 
acquisitions. 
Section 79, on the assignment of certain patents to the state, stipulates that  
[t]he proprietor of an invention relating to any armaments … shall, if called 
upon to do so by the Minister of Defence, assign the invention … to that 
Minister on behalf of the State. … (8) [subject to] reasonable compensation 
as may be agreed upon or as may, in default of agreement, be determined by 
arbitration or, if the parties so agree, by the commissioner.32 
                                            
27  Section 78 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
28  Section 79 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
29  Section 80 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
30 Now the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
31  Burrell Burrells South African Patent and Design Law para [3.21]: s 78 authorises 
only a negotiated acquisition and not a unilateral divestment. However, this cannot 
be the provision's purpose since s 4 already lets the state effect a negotiated 
acquisition, like any private party. 
32  Section 79 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
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The Minister can also direct the secrecy of the invention and the manner of 
its performance, in line with the provisions of section 80, subject to 
compensation to the patentee. 
Under section 79 the patentee cannot refuse to assign the invention or 
patent to the state – the wording mandates that the patentee shall assign. 
Parties may negotiate on the compensation, but failing agreement, 
arbitration or the commissioner of patents would determine it. The provision 
explicitly mandates compensation, because the state acquires and 
necessarily takes over all beneficial interests as well as the title of the 
property in the patent or invention, and uncompensated acquisition would 
entail an unconstitutional, uncompensated expropriation. Compensation 
needs to be determined in line with the guidelines set out in section 25(3) of 
the Constitution. Especially since the Patent legislation is pre-constitutional, 
the scope of the powers of the Minister and the way in which compensation 
is determined need re-evaluation during any amendment to the legislation. 
The South African state use provisions were included in the old Patents 
Act,33 and termed "restrictions in favour of the State [and] exceptional 
sacrifices forced on patentees in favour of public interest, [resting] unequally 
on members of the public."34 This is still applicable to the current Patents 
Act, since it always concerns a specific category of patents (related to 
national defence) or a specific patent owner (the use of a specific patent for 
a public purpose). This is very close to the justifications underlying 
compensation for expropriation, which requires a constitutional property 
analysis during the application of the state use provisions to determine 
compliance with the Constitution. 
2.3  Possible improvements to section 4 of the Patents Act as 
suggested in the Intellectual Property Policy Phase 1 2018 
South Africa's Intellectual Property Policy Phase 1 201835 mentions the 
state/government use of patents, citing section 4 of the Patents Act.36 The 
                                            
33  The Patents Act 37 of 1952: ss 58, 59, 60 and 61 on the use, acquisition, assignment 
and compensation, respectively. 
34  Gerntholtz Principles of South African Patent Law 213-217: the German Federal 
Government also can use an invention in the interest of public welfare or for the 
security of the state, subject to reasonable compensation from the state. 
35  Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of South Africa Phase 1 2018 28-29 para 
7.1.9.1. 
36  The previous draft of the policy explicitly included that the state use sections should 
be utilised to promote access to public healthcare. See the Draft Intellectual Property 
Policy of the Republic of South Africa Phase 1 2017 (Gen N 636 in GG 41064 of 25 
August 2017) 24 (7.1.9.1 Government use): "[The] state is obliged to take reasonable 
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policy refers to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights37 (hereafter TRIPS) and suggests updating the government 
use provisions to make full use of the exception contained in Article 31(b) 
of TRIPS. It determines that prior negotiations are not required "in the case 
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in 
cases of public non-commercial use." On the current wording of section 4, 
prior negotiations with the patent owner could be required even where a 
national emergency or other extreme urgency is present, or if the use is 
public non-commercial use.38 However, state use cannot always entail non-
commercial use, such as where the use is for economic development or by 
third parties. Therefore, the state use provisions require careful redrafting to 
distinguish between state use in situations of extreme urgency, public non-
commercial use, and regular situations where prior negotiations would still 
be a requirement. Australia previously held the position that all Crown use 
entailed non-commercial use, but has backtracked by explicitly updating 
their Crown use provisions (by way of a 2020 amendment)39 to require prior 
negotiations except in emergency situations. The United States of 
America's utilisation of Government use provisions40 in neither requiring 
prior negotiations under any circumstances nor informing a patent rights 
                                            
legislative and other measures to realise the right to have access to health care 
services progressively. This includes the utilization of TRIPS flexibilities such as 
Article 31(b), in full accordance with South African law." 
37  See Art 31(b) of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) (TRIPS). South Africa became a member of 
the World Trade Organization on 1 January 1995. See Park, Prabhala and Berger 
Using Law to Accelerate Treatment Access 59-61 (para 2.6.1) on the application of 
Art 31(b) to s 4 of the Patents Act, particularly the interpretation that any government 
use without any restrictions would fall under the "public non-commercial use" 
exception to prior negotiations requirement. 
38  See Park, Prabhala and Berger Using Law to Accelerate Treatment Access 64 (para 
2.6.2.3), contrasting the South African position with that of the United States of 
America (in terms of the Tucker Act 28 USC §1498), and the United Kingdom (in 
terms of s 55(1) of the Patents Act, 1977), which allow much broader powers of 
government use. 
39  The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Productivity Commission Response 
Part 2 and Other Measures) Act 9 of 2020 was enacted into legislation on 27 
February 2020, and the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Productivity 
Commission Response Part 2 and Other Measures) Regulations, 2020 came into 
force on 2 April 2020. This article discusses it in more detail under s 4 "Crown use 
provisions in the Australian Patents Act 83 of 1990" below. 
40  The United States' government use provisions applicable to patents are found in the 
Tucker Act 28 USC §1498 and not in the Patents Act 35 USC. This section provides 
simply that whenever a patent is used or manufactured by the Government, the 
owner is entitled to reasonable and entire compensation. It neither stipulates the 
purposes for which the government may use a patent, nor requires the patent holder 
to be informed of such use. 
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holder of the use is not compliant with TRIPS requirements41 and needs 
careful consideration.42 
The Intellectual Property Policy Phase 1 201843 does not explicitly mention 
the commitment to utilising Article 31 of TRIPS for the progressive 
realisation of access to healthcare, but it does mention the government use 
of patents in the field of pharmaceuticals. The state use provisions can 
certainly further access to healthcare, since it allows the state use of patents 
for a public purpose, and that would include, at the very least, the human 
rights that the state needs to protect and promote (like access to 
healthcare). 
2.4  Preliminary conclusions on the South African state use 
provisions 
Although legislators updated South African compulsory licence provisions44 
in 1997 to include the guidelines from Article 31 of TRIPS,45 this was not 
done in relation to the state use provisions. An update is urgently required 
if the South African state wishes to rely effectively on the state use 
provisions in the public interest or for a public use in compliance with the 
Constitution and TRIPS. This is of even greater importance in the light of 
the state of national disaster caused by the worldwide COVID-19 outbreak. 
It is of paramount importance and plainly in the public interest to get timely 
and affordable access to patented articles such as personal protective 
equipment, vaccines, other pharmaceuticals, ventilators, and testing 
apparatus relating to the pandemic. As such, section 4 of the Patents Act 
must be amended urgently and speedily, in order to explicitly allow for the 
waiver of the prior negotiations requirement when the state needs to utilise 
a patent for a public purpose related to a state of national emergency or 
other situations of extreme urgency. The amended section 4 also needs to 
cater for other non-emergency public uses of patents (both public non-
commercial use and commercial use), and as such must be drafted in a 
nuanced way. The foreign jurisdictions considered below provide some 
guidance, but ultimately the South African position may require a different 
approach to utilise fully TRIPS' Article 31 flexibilities to promote the 
country’s developmental needs. 
                                            
41  See Rushing 2012 Vand J Transnat'l L 879-916. 
42  The position of other jurisdictions is considered in more detail in the sections below. 
43  Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of South Africa Phase 1 2018 28-29 (para 
7.1.9.1 Government use). 
44  Sections 55 and 56 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
45  The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997. 
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3 Crown use provisions in the United Kingdom Patents Act 
1977 
3.1  Historical background of the United Kingdom Crown use 
provisions 
As early as the Venetian Statute of 1474, legislation provided no patent 
protection detrimental to governing authorities' interests.46 The English 
Statute of Monopolies of 1623 was introduced into early South African 
patent law by virtue of the British occupation.47 Hence, the state use 
provisions originated with the Crown use provisions. This shared history 
may shed some light on the nature and function of the provisions. During 
the last quarter of the seventeenth century, patent grants served the 
Crown's business and commerce, and they were awarded mostly in the field 
of currency and military supply. The Crown and military authorities could 
conduct security-related affairs without respect for the patent rights 
granted.48 Historically, Letters Patent did not bind the Crown. This changed 
only in 1883, when the effect of patents came to apply also to the Crown, 
but subject to the Crown use provisions. National security ordinarily justifies 
these provisions, and the notion that the prospect of compensation for 
Crown use as an incentive to continue to invent equates with full patent 
monopoly rights.49 
3.2  The United Kingdom Crown use provisions 
Section 55 of the Patents Act 1977 (hereafter the United Kingdom Patents 
Act) details the use of patented inventions in services of the Crown. 
Sections 56 to 59 provide further guidance on the interpretation of these 
provisions, remuneration for use, and special provisions for Crown use 
during emergencies. These provisions entail special compulsory licences 
benefiting the Crown,50 or an exemption from patentees' exclusive rights.51 
Various questions emerge in the context of Crown use, including who may 
perform the acts in service of the Crown, which acts fall within the 
                                            
46  May and Sell Intellectual Property Rights 85. 
47  Van der Merwe "Law of Patents" 360. 
48  May and Sell Intellectual Property Rights 85. 
49  Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin Intellectual Property 323-324. These provisions may 
feed into the instrumentalist logic as defined by John Dewey. 
50  Bently et al. Intellectual Property Law 688; Pfizer Corporation v Ministry of Health 
[1965] AC 512. 
51  Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin Intellectual Property 323-326. 
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provisions, and what remuneration is due.52 Anyone authorised (in writing) 
to act on the Crown's behalf is included, and authorisation can be given after 
Crown use has already commenced. The provisions exclude selling and 
offering for sale, but include making, using and importing. The provisions do 
not require the state or state-authorised entity to attempt negotiations with 
the patent owner before invoking the Crown use provisions, and an entity 
may obtain authorisation (which provides the Crown use defence) after 
infringing acts have already taken place.53 This does not comply with the 
TRIPS requirement of prior negotiations (unless all Crown use entails non-
commercial use). 
Section 56(2) of the United Kingdom Patents Act includes within the ambit 
of the services of the Crown  
(a) the supply of anything for foreign defence purposes; (b) the production or 
supply of specified drugs and medicines; and (c) such purposes relating to the 
production or use of atomic energy.54 
However, these are merely examples and do not constitute an exhaustive 
list.55 In the South African context, state use involving the supply of  
pharmaceuticals is of particular importance, and a reasonable interpretation 
of section 4 of the South African Patents Act would certainly include this 
under the definition of public use. It would not be necessary to amend 
section 4 to include it explicitly in order to use it for that purpose. 
Section 57(5) of the United Kingdom Patents Act permits the High Court to 
determine the appropriate compensation payable to the patentee or 
exclusive licensee for the loss of manufacturing or other profit, in the event 
of no agreement between the patent holder and the government department 
concerned. The court makes this determination after the commencement of 
Crown use.56 Courts follow an approach similar to that used in compulsory 
licence proceedings: attempting to determine the terms to which a willing 
licensor and licensee would have agreed. Additionally, a court can award 
compensation for lost contracts. Courts may add reasonable manufacturing 
profit as usually included in government tenders over and above any 
notional licence fee for use.57 In line with Article 31 of TRIPS, courts must 
                                            
52  Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin Intellectual Property 324-325. 
53  Dory v Sheffield Health Authority [1991] FSR 221. 
54  Section 56(2) of the United Kingdom Patents Act, 1977. 
55  IPCom GMBH & Co KG v Vodafone Group Plc [2020] EWHC 132 (Pat) paras [188]-
[189]. 
56  Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin Intellectual Property 324-325; Bently et al. Intellectual 
Property Law 689, 696. 
57  Patchett's Patent [1967] RPC 237; Bently et al. Intellectual Property Law 696. 
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factor in the economic value of the Crown use. Section 57A(3) also 
mandates that the "profit which would have been made on such a contract" 
must be considered in determining the compensation for loss. While this 
determination of compensation for Crown use is useful to determine the 
market value of state use, South Africa employs market value as only one 
of the factors considered in determining compensation for expropriation, so 
the result may yet be very different in the light of section 25 of the 
Constitution. 
3.3  Some clarity from a recent United Kingdom case on Crown use 
IPCom GMBH & Co KG v Vodafone Group Plc58 deliberated on the Crown 
use defence, deciding that neither subsection 56(2) nor section 59 of the 
United Kingdom Patents Act provides exclusive lists, but rather embodies 
examples of the kind of services that could be included.59 It also decided 
that an explicit authorisation to fulfil a specific mandate on behalf of the 
Crown would implicitly include authorisation in terms of the Crown use 
provisions to infringe a specific patent. "Vodafone were authorised in writing 
by a government department to provide priority access to their network for 
emergency responders" but confusion remained over whether the express 
authorisation must relate to a particular patent. Requiring this would place 
an extra burden in addition to the requirement in section 55(7)(a) to notify a 
patent owner of any Crown use "as soon as practicable" after the 
commencement of the use, as it would be impractical to identify all possible 
patents that might be implicated.60 In other words, identifying the relevant 
act but not the particular patent in the written authorisation is sufficient to 
authorise Crown use and subsequently to provide the defence to 
infringement. The court mentioned Article 31 of TRIPS and the prior 
negotiations requirement, but deemed them irrelevant to the facts.61 
                                            
58  IPCom GMBH & Co KG v Vodafone Group Plc [2020] EWHC 132 (Pat) paras [184]-
[213], referring to MMI Research v Cellxion [2009] EWHC 1533 (Pat) and Pfizer 
Corporation v Ministry of Health [1965] AC 512: Crown use must have been 
authorised in writing; Henry Brothers (Magherafelt) v Ministry of Defence [1999] RPC 
442, CA: The concept of Crown benefit includes the use of an invention relating to 
prefabricated blast-resistant building structures in a police station. 
59  IPCom GMBH & Co KG v Vodafone Group Plc [2020] EWHC 132 (Pat) paras [188]-
[189]. 
60  IPCom GMBH & Co KG v Vodafone Group Plc [2020] EWHC 132 (Pat) paras [191]-
[194]. 
61  IPCom GMBH & Co KG v Vodafone Group Plc [2020] EWHC 132 (Pat) paras [195]-
[206]. 
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4 Crown use provisions in the Australian Patents Act 83 of 
1990 
4.1  Historical background of the Australian Crown use provisions 
A brief history of the Australian Crown use provisions highlights Australia 
and South Africa's shared historical relationship with United Kingdom law, 
in that both countries' intellectual property legislation evolved from the 
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (IMP). In this regard the United 
Kingdom Crown use provisions were incorporated into section 27(2).62 As 
such, the purpose and justifications of the Crown use provisions in all three 
jurisdictions are comparable. 
In Australian law the ambit and purpose of the Crown use provisions and 
related powers entail exploiting or acquiring patents without the express 
authority of the patentee but subject to remuneration for use (or 
compensation for acquisition), and to balance the grant of exclusive patent 
rights with the Australian public's needs.63 The Australian Crown use 
provisions have undergone a very recent overhaul, and South Africa's state 
use provisions might benefit from this process. 
4.2  The Australian Crown use provisions 
Section 163 of the Patents Act 83 of 1990 (hereafter the Australian Patents 
Act) allows the Commonwealth, a state, or an authorised person64 to exploit 
a patent for the provision of services to the Commonwealth in Australia if 
the invention is necessary for the provision of such services. This 
exploitation does not entail an infringement of the rights in the invention or 
the patent. The Crown use provisions ensure "immediate access to 
inventions for the benefit of the services of the respective governments", 
and provide a "statutory shield against patent infringement actions."65 
However, the new section 163 now qualifies that infringement takes place 
                                            
62  Bodkin Patent Law in Australia 799; Feathers v The Queen [1865] 6 B&S 257. 
63  Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 2005 https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/ 
default/files/acip_final_report_review_of_crown_use_provisions_archived.pdf 1; 
Davison, Monotti and Wiseman Australian Intellectual Property Law 575. See s 171 
(Crown acquisitions), s 172 (assignments to the Crown) and ss 163-170 (Crown 
use). 
64  This might include contractors as well as instruments of the Crown: O'Sullivan and 
Rolls Practical Guide to Australian Patent Law 316. 
65  Davison, Monotti and Wiseman Australian Intellectual Property Law 574-575; Bodkin 
Patent Law in Australia 799. 
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during non-compliance with terms agreed on or determined in terms of 
section 165.66 
The Crown use rights limit a patentee's exploitation rights. Before the 2020 
amendments, the Crown could simply pay compensation for use as agreed 
or determined by the court, without prior authorisation negotiations with the 
patentee.67 The 2020 amendments68 added the requirement of prior 
negotiations with the patent rights holder before the commencement of any 
use, bar in instances of emergency (in which case the rights holder is still 
entitled to written notice of the order for Crown use and the terms and 
conditions). The provisions now explicitly require that the relevant authority 
must have "tried for a reasonable period, but without success, to obtain from 
the applicant and the nominated person, or the patentee, an authorisation 
to exploit the invention on reasonable terms".69 The relevant Minister must 
have given written approval before the commencement of any exploitation, 
and the rights holder must receive notice of approval and written reasons 
for the approval at least 14 days before the initiation of the exploitation.70 
Crown use exemptions facilitate the exploitation of a patented invention for 
the proper provision of services of the Commonwealth (the Australian 
government) or a state (a particular state in Australia). However, it was 
unclear exactly which services were included under these provisions; 
particularly whether something like the provision of "railway transport or 
public hospital services, or the provision of pharmaceutical drugs in public 
hospitals" would be included.71 Crown use provisions could feature where 
gene patents are required in the provision of public healthcare, where public 
research requires biotechnology patents, and healthcare services and 
products could be explicitly included under the Crown use concept of 
services.72 South Africa could advance healthcare interests similarly, 
especially considering the Intellectual Property Policy and the state's 
                                            
66  Section 163(2) of the Patents Act 83 of 1990, as amended in 2020. 
67  Van Caenegem Intellectual Property Law and Innovation 107; O'Sullivan and Rolls 
Practical Guide to Australian Patent Law 315-319: Crown use provisions entail a 
"significant qualification on the monopoly rights of a patentee" permitting use for the 
provision of public services and in the public interest, citing Banks British Patent 
System (Banks Committee Report) 121. 
68  Introduced by the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Productivity Commission 
Response Part 2 and Other Measures) Act 9 of 2020. 
69  Section 163(3) of the Patents Act 83 of 1990, as amended in 2020. 
70  Section 163(3) of the Patents Act 83 of 1990, as amended in 2020. 
71  Van Caenegem Intellectual Property Law in Australia 112-113. Nielsen and Nicol 
2008 Fed L Rev 339 agree that the use of Crown use provisions for humanitarian 
purposes needs greater exploration. 
72  Australian Law Reform Commission Genes and Ingenuity ch 26; Nielsen and Nicol 
2008 Fed L Rev 360. 
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obligations towards socioeconomic rights such as healthcare, and the 
national disaster caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Section 160A(4) was added to the Australian Patents Act to clarify that 
Crown use services are those that are primarily provided or funded by either 
the Commonwealth or the relevant State or Territory (or in combination). 
This approach may inform South African law, as it could imply the inclusion 
of services that the South African State and provinces primarily provide 
and/or fund: municipal, healthcare and educational services, among others. 
There are two diverging general justifications for Crown use provisions in 
Australian law. First, the government grants the patent monopoly (a 
privilege) and this should not impede the fulfilment of its functions, since the 
government should still have timeous access to new technology for service 
provision. Secondly, use for public purposes and the concomitant benefits 
outweigh the decrease in the innovation incentive. Any concerns that 
lowered incentives may completely prevent invention are countered by 
adequate Crown use remuneration. Also, prior negotiations are now strictly 
required, except in instances of national emergency. 
Vaguely phrased Crown use provisions cover a wide array of situations, and 
are used rarely and carefully.73 In Stack v Brisbane City Council74 the 
Federal Court of Australia considered the Crown use of a patent over water 
meters by the Brisbane City Council to levy charges for the supply to users 
based on consumption. The 2020 amendments address some of the 
concerns that prevent utilisation of the Crown use provisions so that they 
can address market failure more efficiently. 
It is generally assumed that though the provisions are seldom used, "the 
threat of utilising the Crown use provisions [assists] Crown bodies to compel 
                                            
73  Nielsen and Nicol 2008 Fed L Rev 336: Despite arguments that the mere existence 
of the provisions promotes voluntary licensing activities, this may not be enough to 
"justify the ongoing presence of unused and unusable legislative provisions." In 
addition to the Crown use provisions (and like s 80 of the South African Patents Act), 
s 173 of the Australian Patents Act permits the restriction or prohibition of the 
publication of information from a patent application (even an international 
application) in the interest of the defence of the Commonwealth. Thus, access to 
micro-organism deposits may be restricted. See O'Sullivan and Rolls Practical Guide 
to Australian Patent Law 318. 
74  Stack v Brisbane City Council (1995) 32 IPR 69; Van Caenegem 1995 QLSJ 55; 
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner of Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 
125: An invention for the construction of rail carriages falls under these provisions; 
Bowrey, Handler and Nicol Australian Intellectual Property 523-525. 
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parties to enter into licensing agreements voluntarily."75 Concerns that the 
threat of invoking the Crown use provisions might put patent owners in an 
unequal bargaining position and lower confidence in the Australian patent 
system76 have little legitimacy, since Crown use attracts remuneration, 
which balances economic incentives and public interests. Remuneration for 
Crown use is determined similarly to remuneration for compulsory licences, 
so any perceived unfairness would probably be similar in both instances. 
4.3  The impact of Article 31 of TRIPS on the Australian Crown use 
provisions 
Another issue77 was the TRIPS Agreement's78 Article 31 requirement of 
prior negotiations with the patent holder. This entails that the state must first 
attempt to obtain a voluntary licence from the patent holder, and states can 
waive these obligations only in urgent situations such as national 
emergencies79 or in circumstances of public non-commercial use.80 While 
the previous section 163(1) required notification to a patent owner, 
authorisation for Crown use was automatic (no application to the Federal 
Court was necessary), and no prior negotiation for a voluntary licence was 
required.81 An update to Australian patent law included the prior 
negotiations requirement for compulsory licence provisions in 1994,82 but 
not in relation to the Crown use provisions until 2020, as explained. The 
reason previously given for waiving the prior negotiations requirement was 
                                            
75  Nielsen and Nicol 2008 Fed L Rev 361; Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 
2005 
https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/default/files/acip_final_report_review_of_crown
_use_provisions_archived.pdf 8: Although there are few cases on Crown use, abuse 
of the provisions may occur without formal invocation. 
76  Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 2005 https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/ 
default/files/acip_final_report_review_of_crown_use_provisions_archived.pdf 1. 
77  Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 2005 https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/ 
default/files/acip_final_report_review_of_crown_use_provisions_archived.pdf 1. 
78  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994). 
79  The WTO's Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (2001) 
5(a) explains that Member states can each determine the meaning of "national 
emergency" and "extreme urgency", adding that a public health crisis is included. 
See De Carvalho TRIPS Regime 31.33: a national emergency is an example of 
extreme urgency and the urgency must be extreme before the exception from prior 
licensing negotiations may be implemented. The economic value of the government 
use must be considered when determining the terms of use (including 
compensation). 
80  See Van Caenegem Intellectual Property Law in Australia 113; Davison, Monotti and 
Wiseman Australian Intellectual Property Law 574-580; Nielsen et al. 2014 AIPJ 74-
92. 
81  Nielsen and Nicol 2008 Fed L Rev 339. 
82  Patents (World Trade Organisation Amendments) Act, 1994 (Cth). 
M DU BOIS  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  19 
that all Crown use entailed public non-commercial use.83 Although the 
Australian Crown use provisions are now compliant with Article 31 of TRIPS, 
the previous approach and its developments remain important, since South 
African policy makers wish to interpret and develop the state use provisions 
under the public non-commercial use exception. As long as the amendment 
distinguishes between instances of national emergency, public non-
commercial use, and instances where state use does not fall under the 
public non-commercial exception, this will be a desirable development. 
The scope of all Crown use/state use/government use provisions is limited 
by international obligations, particularly in sections 30 and 31 of TRIPS, 
which probably prompted Australia's 2020 amendments.84 The minimum 
standards of protection required from TRIPS members bind Australia and 
South Africa equally.85 South African lawmakers should consider this aspect 
fully, to amend the state use provisions in the South African Patents Act in 
a nuanced way in line with the goals and suggestions in the Intellectual 
Property Policy. Article 31 of TRIPS, which is applicable to Crown use 
provisions as well as compulsory licences (because it stipulates "use by the 
government or third parties authorized by the government"), explicitly 
stipulates: 
[U]se may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made 
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a 
reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in 
the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency 
or in cases of public non-commercial use [emphasis supplied].86 
Australia enacted the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Productivity 
Commission Response Part 2 and Other Measures) Act 2020 into 
                                            
83  Nielsen and Nicol 2008 Fed L Rev 343: even before the introduction of Art 31bis on 
pharmaceutical products, the provision was "cumbersome, inefficient and 
unworkable". Also see Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 2005 
https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/default/files/acip_final_report_review_of_crown
_use_provisions_archived.pdf 16, referring to Review of Legislation in the Fields of 
Patents, Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits, Protection of 
Undisclosed Information and Control of Anti-competitive Practices in Contractual 
Licences, Response to the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, World Trade Organisation, Geneva (1997). 
84  Nielsen and Nicol 2008 Fed L Rev 340: while Art 7 of TRIPS purports to encourage 
finding a balance between the needs of intellectual property rights owners and users 
of intellectual property objects, member states have found it difficult to utilise TRIPS 
flexibilities. 
85  Both countries have been members of TRIPS since 1 January 1995. 
86  TRIPS Art 31(b). 
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legislation on 27 February 2020,87 and the Intellectual Property Laws 
Amendment (Productivity Commission Response Part 2 and Other 
Measures) Regulations 2020 came into force on 2 April 2020. They amend 
the Crown use provisions. This amendment explicitly bringing the Australian 
Crown use provisions in line with the TRIPS obligations is very timely in the 
light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Australian Minister of Industry is 
already considering implementing the Crown use provisions in order to stop 
patent rights from preventing Australia from responding to the health 
emergency adequately.88 South Africa should also be ready and willing to 
amend and use the state use provisions encapsulated in section 4 of the 
South African Patents Act in order to further the public purpose of facilitating 
access to healthcare in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its 
concomitant fallouts, but also for broader purposes. 
This 2020 Australian amendment implements the prior negotiations 
requirement explicitly,89 and overtly provides for its waiver only in 
emergencies.90 Even this exception still states that infringement would not 
be excused if an agreement has been reached but the terms are not 
complied with. The relevant Minister must still approve any exploitation in 
writing, prior to the commencement of such exploitation. It also still requires 
that the rights holder must be informed of the approval of the exploitation 
with reasons, although the "14 days before commencement" rule is relaxed 
to "as soon as practicable after" the Minister's approval. 
Previously there were questions regarding the meaning of "authorised"91 
(regarding who may invoke the Crown use provisions).92 The 2020 
amendment now explicitly refers to the Relevant Minister. In South African 
                                            
87  IP Australia 2020 https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about-us/public-consultations/ 
intellectual-property-laws-amendment-productivity-commission-response on 
Schedules 1 and 2: the Act improves transparency and accountability for Crown use, 
delimits when it is applicable, introduces Ministerial oversight, assists courts with the 
remuneration standard to determine adequate compensation for the rights holder, 
and improves the balance between the rights holder and the community's access to 
technology (via Government). 
88  Hay et al. 2020 https://corrs.com.au/insights/covid-19-when-do-private-patent-
rights-give-way-to-the-public-interest: Crown use provisions are particularly apt in 
responding to COVID-19 because they can assist in meeting the demand for medical 
equipment, pharmaceuticals, personal protective equipment, and a vaccine once 
available, and promote local manufacturing. 
89  Section 163(3) of the Patents Act 83 of 1990. 
90  Section 163A of the Patents Act 83 of 1990. 
91  Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 2005 https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/ 
default/files/acip_final_report_review_of_crown_use_provisions_archived.pdf 1. 
92  See Bodkin Patent Law in Australia 800-804 for a discussion of some cases that 
shed light on the meaning of public authority and its application to the meaning of 
authority of the Commonwealth or of a State. 
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law, the state power provisions specify the relevant authority as the Minister 
of Economic Affairs and Technology93 for section 4 use and section 78 
acquisitions; the Minister of Defence for section 79 assignments, and any 
Minister of State for section 80 secrecy issues. 
4.4  Remuneration for Crown use 
On remuneration and terms for exploitation, section 165 of the Australian 
Patents Act states that the authorised party invoking the Crown use 
provisions and the holder of the patent rights may agree upon them, but 
failing that, a prescribed court may make such determination upon 
application by either party.94 The 2020 amendment updated section 165, 
notably adding that absent agreement, the terms for exploitation and 
remuneration must be determined by the prescribed court, determining just 
and reasonable remuneration, "regarding the economic value of the 
exploitation of the invention and any other matter the court considers 
relevant." The South African provisions state (in much less detail) that a 
court can determine the terms, which would include remuneration. 
Nonetheless, a court must consider constitutional principles and the 
guidelines in the property clause95 in determining adequate remuneration, 
especially since section 4 of the South African Patents Act references public 
purposes, closely matching the wording of section 25 of the Constitution. If 
adequate remuneration (determined as guided by constitutional principles) 
is provided to the patent owner by the State, it would certainly be much 
harder to pinpoint any (arbitrary) deprivation or uncompensated 
expropriation during any potential subsequent constitutional property review 
following a determination made by a High Court judge sitting as the 
commissioner of patents. 
Australian law suggests two standards (used in compulsory licence 
proceedings) that a court might utilise to determine remuneration for a 
patent holder whose patent is subject to a compulsory licence: remuneration 
based on a standard that adequately compensates the holder, or 
remuneration based on a reasonable royalty (generally the lower rate 
                                            
93  Now the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
94  Bodkin Patent Law in Australia 805-807 cites the English Court of Appeal case of 
Patchett's Patent [1967] FSR 249 at 256 per Willmer LJ at 263 per Diplock LJ and 
at 268 per Winn LJ to argue that compensation for Crown use should be determined 
"as if the 'Crown user' were a licensee under the patent, and appropriate terms are 
those that would be agreed between a willing licensee and a willing licensor, both 
bargaining on equal terms" and taking into account the extent of the use and 
considerations that would be relevant in the case of a compulsory licence. 
95  Section 25(3) of the Constitution. 
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between the two). Most often, compulsory licensing proceedings use a 
reasonable royalty rate, generally interpreted as that amount on which a 
willing licensor and willing licensee would agree, factoring in the monopoly 
profit and variables like risk and delays in return.96 
4.5  Patent acquisition by the Australian Commonwealth 
The Australian Patents Act provides for the acquisition of inventions or 
patents by the Commonwealth, stipulating that the patent holder must 
receive compensation, which is to be determined by a court in the absence 
of agreement.97 Section 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act, 1900 (UK) (the property clause) is explicitly mentioned in 
academic discussions of state acquisitions of patents,98 confirming that 
Crown utilisation provisions provide for a compulsory acquisition (or use 
against the wishes of a patent owner) where negotiations have failed. For a 
compulsory acquisition to comply with section 51(xxxi) there must be 
compensation on just terms.99 While "the power to enact laws with respect 
to the acquisition of property on just terms under section 51 (xxxi)" is an 
alternative power on which the Commonwealth Government may rely when 
it is necessary to use intellectual property without the owner's consent, more 
legislation would then be needed replacing the Crown provisions.100 This 
transposes to South African law. In place of the state power provisions that 
authorise the utilisation, acquisition and assignment of patents by the South 
African Government, the process would probably have to take place via the 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, which grants the power to expropriate to a 
variety of governmental institutions.101 
5 Use of patents by Government in the Canadian Patent 
Act RSC 1985 c P4 
5.1  Canadian Crown use of patents 
The Crown could freely use patents at common law, but it was limited in the 
sense that the immunity extended only to government employees or agents 
                                            
96  Nielsen and Nicol 2008 Fed L Rev 354. 
97  Section 171(4) of the Patents Act 83 of 1990; Bodkin Patent Law in Australia 807. 
98  Van Caenegem Intellectual Property Law in Australia 113. 
99  O'Sullivan and Rolls Practical Guide to Australian Patent Law 318. 
100  Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 2005 https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/ 
sites/default/files/acip_final_report_review_of_crown_use_provisions_archived.pdf 
9-10. 
101  Section 173(3) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. See O'Sullivan and Rolls 
Practical Guide to Australian Patent Law 318. 
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and not to contractors, and voluntary payments accompanied patent use so 
that inventions potentially assisting the state in military activities remained 
incentivised. Until 1994 the federal government simply paid reasonable 
compensation for the use of a patent, as determined by the Commissioner 
of Patents where the parties could not agree on suitable remuneration.102 
Since 1994, after TRIPS, the Canadian federal and provincial governments 
have to negotiate with patent holders before using their patents. Only where 
the negotiations fail can they apply to the Commissioner of Patents for a 
non-exclusive right permitting the domestic use of the patent.103 National 
emergency, other extreme urgency or public non-commercial use may 
justify waiving the requirement of prior negotiations, but not the 
Commissioner's prior consent.104 Public non-commercial use includes 
purposes like building a bridge where tolls merely recoup building costs, 
providing public health care, acquiring medicine, conducting public 
university research, and in defence of the country.105 
Section 19(1) of the Patent Act RSC 1985 c P4 (hereafter the Canadian 
Patent Act) provides that "the Commissioner may, on application by the 
Government of Canada or the government of a province, authorize the use 
of a patented invention by that government". However, section 19(4) on 
payment of remuneration mentions nothing of agreement between the 
authorised user and the holder of the patent rights. It states only that "the 
authorized user shall pay to the patentee such amount as the Commissioner 
considers to be adequate remuneration in the circumstances, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorization." This remuneration 
probably entails what "a willing licensor and non-exclusive licensee would 
notionally have agreed on for Canadian rights as equal bargaining 
parties."106 The Canadian Crown use provisions meet the TRIPS 
requirement of prior negotiations with the patentee. The applicant must 
establish that "it has made efforts to obtain from the patentee on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions the authority to use the patented 
invention; and its efforts have not been successful within a reasonable 
                                            
102  Vaver Intellectual Property Law 413-414; MacDonald v Canada (1906) 10 Ex CR 
338; Dixon v London Small Arms Co Ltd (1876) 1 App Cas 632 (HL) 647. 
103  Section 19.1(1)(a) and (b) of the Patent Act RSC 1985 c P4. 
104  Section 19.1(2) of the Patent Act RSC 1985 c P4. 
105  Vaver Intellectual Property Law 414; Reichman and Hasenzahl Non-voluntary 
Licensing of Patented Inventions: Canadian Experience 45-50; Reichman and 
Hasenzahl Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective 
19-22. 
106  Vaver Intellectual Property Law 414. 
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period" unless there is a national emergency, a case of extreme urgency or 
public non-commercial use. 
Similar to the provisions in South African, United Kingdom and Australian 
patent legislation, Canadian legislation also provides for the government 
acquisition of patents, subject to compensation (section 20 of the Canadian 
Patent Act). 
5.2  The COVID-19 Emergency Response Act SC 2020 c 5 
Canada assented to the COVID-19 Emergency Response Act SC 2020 c 5 
on 23 March 2020. It makes a broad range of temporary changes to existing 
legislation in response to the COVID-19 emergency. Notably Part 12 of this 
Act amends the Canadian Patent Act by adding section 19.4(1)-(9), which 
contains a number of clarifications of the government use of patents during 
a public health emergency. Subsection 19.4(9) limits the period of use of 
this emergency legislation to 30 September 2020. Subsection 19.4(1) 
states: 
The Commissioner shall, on the application of the Minister of Health, authorize 
the Government of Canada and any person specified in the application to 
make, construct, use and sell a patented invention to the extent necessary to 
respond to the public health emergency described in the application.107 
Notably, the amendment mandates that an application to the Minister of 
Health must mention the specific patent affected (subsection 19.4(2)(a) and 
"specify a person, if any, that is to be authorized to make, construct, use 
and sell the patented invention for the purposes of responding to the public 
health emergency" (subsection 19.4(2)(d)). Subsection 19.4(5) clarifies the 
remuneration payable under such emergency circumstances:  
The Government of Canada and any person authorized under subsection (1) 
shall pay the patentee any amount that the Commissioner considers to be 
adequate remuneration in the circumstances, taking into account the 
economic value of the authorization and the extent to which they make, 
construct, use and sell the patented invention.108 
Nothing in this emergency legislation is exceptional compared to the general 
crown use provisions in the Canadian Patent Act, in the sense that there 
was nothing in the general exception to prior negotiations under the existing 
section 19.1 that would prevent the Canadian Government from utilising a 
patent speedily in a national emergency (such as the COVID-19 epidemic). 
The emergency legislation seems rather to limit the government's powers 
                                            
107  Section 19.4(1) of the COVID-19 Emergency Response Act SC 2020 c 5. 
108  Section 19.4(5) of the COVID-19 Emergency Response Act SC 2020 c 5. 
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and the scope of patent use in mandating that an application must specify 
the patent in issue and the authorised person, and limiting the exclusive 
rights of the patent holder that may be utilised by the government under 
these legislative measures. 
However, South Africa may certainly follow suit in the sense of speedily 
updating the South African state power provisions for patents in response 
to the public health emergency caused by COVID-19. 
6 Conclusion 
This article highlights the most important aspects of state use provisions 
that need contemplation when reviewing South African patent law based on 
the Intellectual Property Policy Part 1 2018. The urgency of getting clarity 
on what is permitted under state use for public purposes has intensified in 
the light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The provisions also require an update 
explicitly detailing that negotiating with a patent holder prior to state use is 
unnecessary in instances of national emergency or other instances of 
extreme urgency. Section 4 of the South African Patents Act allows the 
Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology109 to use an invention for 
public purposes on terms as agreed with the patentee or as determined by 
the commissioner of patents, permitting the patentee to be heard before 
determination. The conditions determined must include adequate 
compensation, taking into account the current use and market value of the 
property, any state investment in creating the property, and the purpose of 
the use, in line with section 25(3) of the Constitution. The purpose of the 
state use may even mandate a higher level of compensation to incentivise 
the creation of inventions with public benefits. 
The legislative amendment must clarify which exclusive patent rights are 
affected – will this entail making, using, exercising, disposing, offering to 
dispose of, or importing the invention? United Kingdom law excludes selling 
and offering for sale (unless ancillary or incidental to the other exclusive 
rights) from rights permitted for Crown use (encompassing the public non-
commercial use exception), while Australian law includes selling under 
Crown use (section 167 of the Australian Patents Act). Each exclusive right 
has a different market value. Important considerations also include whether 
use is temporary as well as the portion of the monopoly period impacted on. 
                                            
109  Now the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
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Determining compensation only after use is practical, though this is 
separate from the prior negotiations issue. 
The South African state use provisions should define public use in more 
detail, guided by the meaning as used in section 25 of the Constitution. 
Specifying use for foreign defence purposes, the production or supply of 
specified drugs and medicines, and the production or use of atomic energy 
as in United Kingdom law, as examples of possible public uses would be 
useful, but it must be an open list allowing the commissioner of patents to 
decide the scope as required. Section 4 does not indicate whether the 
Minister may authorise only government institutions or also private entities 
providing government services (via tenders), and it is likely that in South 
Africa it would have to include private entities. 
The legislative amendment to section 4 must provide guidelines for 
determining adequate remuneration for the restrictions on patent use in 
favour of the state (exceptional and unequal burdens forced on specific 
patentees in favour of public interest). Determining what a willing licensor 
and licensee might have agreed on, mindful of the economic value of the 
patent utilisation by the state, is merely a departure point. All of the factors 
as specified in section 25(3) of the Constitution need consideration in 
determining adequate remuneration. United Kingdom law remunerates 
generously in order to adequately encourage innovation, while Australian 
law views the benefit of the public use as outweighing any lowered incentive 
to innovate. Australian law generally recommends remuneration 
somewhere between adequate remuneration and a reasonable royalty, with 
the latter being the lower of the two. 
Article 31 of TRIPS permits the government use of patents only if efforts 
were made to obtain authorisation from the rights holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions, and this must be done prior to any such 
use. Only in cases of national emergency, extreme urgency or for public 
non-commercial use (and there are questions as to the limits of the Crown 
use falling into the last category) may this requirement be waived. While the 
United Kingdom does not currently implement the prior negotiations 
requirement (based on public non-commercial use), the March 2020 
amendments to section 163 of the Australian Patents Act in Australia have 
brought this jurisdiction in line with Article 31 of TRIPS. The amendment to 
section 4 of the South African Patents Act should explicitly distinguish 
between the three different situations of state use: First, state use during an 
emergency or a situation of extreme urgency, in which case no prior 
negotiations are required and the patent holder is simply notified as soon as 
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possible. Secondly, state use for public non-commercial use where prior 
negotiations are not required, but selling or offering for sale is excluded from 
the permitted state uses. Finally, any other state use that does not fall in the 
prior two categories; in other words, where the use would be commercial, in 
which case prior negotiations would be required before the use commences. 
In all three cases remuneration would be due, but its extent would be 
determined at different stages according to the category of state use. 
South Africa should urgently update the state use provisions in the Patents 
Act in order to indicate clearly that state use provisions may be used without 
prior negotiations in a national emergency or any other situation of extreme 
urgency, of which the pandemic caused by COVID-19 is one example. As 
noted, the issue of waiving the prior negotiations requirement for state use 
in the instance of public non-commercial use should be addressed very 
carefully, since there may definitely be instances of public use that would 
be non-commercial, but state use could also be allowed for commercial 
purposes and in that case prior negotiations would be required (in line with 
Article 31 of TRIPS). 
While various questions remain, it is imperative that public use as permitted 
in section 4 of the South African Patents Act must be informed by public use 
as formulated in section 25 of the Constitution. What is permitted under 
state use should be determined not by the status of the persons actually 
rendering the services for public use, but by the nature of the services 
themselves. Explicit permission to render a state service should include the 
use of patents generally, in the interest of expediency. The open formulation 
in section 4 of the South African Patents Act may be adequate; leaving it to 
the designated authorities to decide on a case by case basis what would 
constitute public use, fair terms of exploitation, and just compensation. This 
is especially pertinent to South Africa, given its advanced human rights 
framework as provided by the Constitution. 
The state of national disaster caused by the worldwide COVID-19 outbreak 
necessitates timely and affordable access to patented products or 
processes (personal protective equipment, vaccines, other 
pharmaceuticals, ventilators, and testing apparatus relating to the 
pandemic). This clearly constitutes a public purpose under section 4 of the 
Patents Act, falling under the TRIPS exception waiving prior negotiations for 
emergency/extremely urgent situations; but to avoid doubt the state use 
provisions must be updated in a way that is openly compatible with the 
Constitution and TRIPS. 
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